Volume 19

Issue 1

1-1914

Dickinson Law Review - Volume 19, Issue 1

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra

Recommended Citation
Dickinson Law Review - Volume 19, Issue 1, 19 DICK. L. REV. 1 (2020).
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol19/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu.

DiGkinson Law Review
OCTOBER, 1914

VOL. XIX
EDITORS
Raymond Fulton Smith
Thomas William Bender
H man Rockmaker

No. 1

BUSINESS MANAGERS
William Arthur Gunter
Elmer Lloyd Evans
J. Russell Yates

Subscription $1.25 per annum, payable in advance

PROPERTY EXEMPT FROM LOCAL ASSESSMENT
It has frequently been held that property exempt from
general taxation may nevertheless be subject to local assessment. The property of churches and other public charities is a familiar example. On the other hand, property
subject to annual taxation is sometimes exempt from local
assessment. Rural property is a case in point. This difference has led to some confusion in the minds of the judges
and to conflict in the decisions. It is our purpose to review
the Pennsylvania cases involving the property of railroads
and street railways, of jails, court houses, schools and other
public property, and also of religious and charitable organizations and cemeteries.
"Municipal charges for street improvements, although
included within the generic term of taxation, have nevertheless been reduced to a species. Taxation in its largest and
most comprehensive sense is now divided into periodical
taxation for general purposes, as the annual taxes for the
support of government, and taxation for special purposes,
which is not charged periodically, but only when a special
benefit is conferred upon property, which is theoretically,
at least, supposed to follow upon an improvement of the
street in front of it. Annual taxes, therefore, form one
species, and assessments for street improvements form another. Whether other species will be developed must be
left to the evolution of the future."'
'Opinion of Judge Arnold, Phila. v. N. Pa. R. R. Co., 1 Super., 254.
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RAILROAD CASES-THE ROADBED

Let us first examine the railroad cases. The four
earliest decisions form what are known as the "roadbed
cases."
Though the reasons given for the conclusion
reached in these cases underwent alteration, it continues
to be the law, to wit: the road bed of a railroad may not be
assessed for any kind of improvement upon an adjoining
street.
In the first case, Phila. v. P. W. & B. R. R. Co., 33 Pa.,
41, a street was paved where it ran side by side with the
defendant's railroad and it was sought to charge the defendant with half the cost of it. The opinion of the
Said Lowrie, J., "Their
Supreme Court was brief.
claim has no foundation either in the letter of the
law or in its spirit, nor in the form of the remedy. Not in the letter, because the defendants do
not own the land sought to be charged, and have only their
right of way over it. Not in the spirit, because the paving
laws are means of compulsory contribution among the common sharers of a common benefit, and as a railroad cannot,
from its very nature, derive any benefit from the paving,
which all the rest of the neighborhood may, we cannot presume that the compulsion was intended to be applied to
them. Not in the form of the remedy, because the execution for this sort of claim is levari facias, a writ not commonly allowed against corporations and which would hardly produce much when directed against a public right of
way. It would be strange legislation that 'vould authorize
the soil of one public road to be taxed, in order to raise
funds to make or improve a neighboring one."
The first reason, non-ownership of the fee, was soon
held to be immaterial, the same immunity applying to railroads who did own the fee. The existence of benefit as the
necessary basis of the assessment has been long abandoned
except as a pretty theory, e. g., cemeteries completely filled
with graves have been held to be assessable for water pipes,
sewers and street paving. As to the form of execution, it
would have been time enough for the court to intervene to
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control that, when the railroad had failed to pay the judgment.
In 12 W. N. C., 10, it was held that railroad companies
are liable to assessment for benefits for street opening,
the Supreme Court saying: "We see no reason why the
railroad companies should not be liable for any increase
in the value of their properties by the opening of the streets
in question. We have nothing to do on the record with the
question of how these benefits are to be collected."
In these days when assumpsit is usually available as an
added remedy, it is curious that an immunity should exist
which rests alone on the supposed difficulty of enforcing
payment by means of a judgment in rem.
The paving in the above case had been done under an
Act of Assembly that directed that the cost thereof "be
charged to the owners of property fronting thereon, in proportion to the actual front owned by each." Failing to
collect from the railroad company, resort was had to the
owners of the fee in the land occupied by the road bed,
they also being the owners of the land separated from the
street only by the railroad tracks. They also resisted payment and the Supreme Court held there was no liability
resting upon them to pay. In Phila. v. Eastwick, 35 Pa.,
45, we have the decision. Read, J., says that a railroad is
itself a public highway and "how can it be said that this
lot fronts on the Gray's Ferry Road, when its real front is
upon anotherpublic highway, the railroad, forty-seven feet
south of it."
We are left to wonder whether the contractor, who
did the paving and took the liens in payment, lost half the
cost of his work, as well as the cost of his two appeals, or
whether he succeeded in collecting -thefull cost of the pav'
ing from those who owned the land on the other side of the
street. That this last could have been done, we infdr from
McGonigle v. Allegheny, 44 Pa., 118, and Levi v. Oakmont
Boro, 44 Super., 631. Persons who are so unfortunate as
to own land across the street from that acquired by one of
the exempt classes of owners enjoy thereafter the exclusive
privilege of paying for all improvements to the street.
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Paving and sewers may be much more important for the
proper enjoyment of the exempt property, e. g., a school,
than they would be for the private owners of the land opposite but the school district cannot be assessed for improvements, though made for the special benefit of the
school, and now -thatit is no longer necessary that the property owners petition for the improvement, there seems to
be no protection against this obvious injustice. (See Act
of May 12, 1911, P. L., 288).
The second railroad case was Junction R. R. Co. v.
Phila., 88 Pa., 424. In this case the paving was done on a
street that crossed the railroad at right angles and not,
as in the preceding case, on a street that ran by the side of
the railroad. The crossing, however, was by an overhead
bridge and the paving for which the railroad was assessed
was all on this bridge. The court below argued that as
owners of land above or below the grade of a street are not
generally exempt from assessment on this account, and as
the railroad owned its road bed in fee, it should pay the
assessment. He was reversed, however, Justice Paxson,
holding that the exemption of railroads exists regardless
of the character of their title, be it right of wav or fee simple. He -thought the absence of benefit to the railroad
justified the presumption that the legislature intended to
exempt them from assessment, though it had never so declared. He also thought a sale of the fee subject to the
possession of the railroad would bring no substantial price,
and as the right of way could not be sold in small sections
and the operation of the road thus interrupted, the execution of a judgment would not be practicable.
The opinion of Judge Yerkes, is reported in 35 Leg.
Int., 192, and in it we find the following: "It may be that
any proceedings to enforce the lien would vest a title subject t.o" the easement or the franchise of the company, but
that does not seem any reason why whatever interest the
company may have in the land in excess of the necessities
of the easement should not be subject to lien and levy and
sale." This idea, rejected on the appeal by the Supreme
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Court, was later adopted in Phila. v. Phila. & Reading R. R.
Co., 177 Pa., 292.
Referring to this opinion of Judge Yerkes, it was said
by Judge Clayton in Chester City v. C. & D. R. R. R. Co.,
5 C. C., 387: "It is very hard to escape from the soundness of the reasoning of' the court below yet the Supreme
Court disposes of the whole question with the remark that
the distinction between the ownership in fee and the easement for railroad purposes is but shadowy. In view of the
numerous changes made by the Pennsylvania Railroad
Company in straightening its roads and the many abandoned roads all over the State, the right of ownership of
the fee is more than shadowy. The elevated roads can and
do use the fee for other than railroad purposes. In some
places they are used as general storehouses."
The argument as to the probable legislative intent was
soon set at rest by a statute in which it was specifically
stated that the persons assessable should include "all individuals, incorporated companies and associations having
any interest" in the properties abutting on the streets improved and in case the property assessed could not be sold
on a judgment, as in the case of a railroad, then its personal
property should be sold on a fi. fa. The only way to save
the railroads was to declare the statute unconstitutional
and this the Supreme Court proceeded to do. In Allegheny City v. West Penna. R. R. Co., 138 Pa., 375, that
court, again speaking through Justice Paxson, held that a
roadbed of a railroad is the one and only species of property that cannot derive benefit from street improvements,
though in all other cases the question of benefit could not
be raised, there being a "conclusive presumption" that the
benefit exists. "In the absence of any such benefit, in a
case where we can declare as a matter of law no such benefit can arise, the legislature is powerless to impose such
a burden. It would not be a tax in any proper sense of the
term; it would be in the nature of a forced loan and would
practically amount to confiscation." In this case, as in the
first one, the improved street ran parallel with the railroad
and the two differed some twelve to fifteen feet in grade,
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so that the want of benefit seemed clear. The railroads
had not at that date begun to spend large sums in support
of the good roads propaganda, so that the allegation that
they had no interest in such improvements sounded the
more plausible.
The fourth roadbed case, and the last reported case
of this type, is again a case of paving a railroad crossing.
This time, however, the paved way was a subway, instead
of an overhead crossing. There is no reported case in
which the railroad crosses a street at grade. In Erie v.
Piece of Land, 175 Pa., 523, the Lake Shore R. R. owned
the land fronting on both sides of the paving in question
and it was occupied by the abutments and embankments
supporting their high grade line. In a brief per curiam,
the Supreme Court said: "The reason why such property
so used, is exempt from taxation as real estate, is ,that it
is not real estate but is a part of the corporate franchise.
If any part of the ground in question was used for other
purposes -than as the bed of a railroad, that portion would
be liable to taxation." This is the reason given in the line
of cases involving the question as to what property is exempt from annual taxation for general purposes and the
court confounds the questions of liability to such taxation
and liability to local assessment, questions which in many
cases receive contrary answers. All three of the reasons
advanced in the earlier cases are abandoned, but the court
holds fast to the rule that the municipality must pay for
the paving of the intersection of a street and a railroad,
just as it must pay for the intersection of two streets.
Since it is held that the front foot rule allows the assessment of the entire cost of an improvement upon the abutting properties of the non-exempt classes, regardless of
the non-existence of benefit equal to the assessment, we
may readily have a case of the paving of five hundred
feet of street, twenty-five per cent. of which consist of
railroad crossing, perhaps at grade, perhaps in a subway
or on an overhead viaduct. In such a case, the private
owners of the land abutting on the balance of the improvement would have to pay for the work done through the
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railroad property as well as that in front of their own
property. In its anxiety to avoid inflicting hardships upon the railroads, the court fails to advert to the other alternative of hardship upon the owners of adjacent property. Which is the greater hardship, to make a railroad
pave the portion of a street crossed by its tracks, as part
of the price of occupying the ground and excluding private
owners liable to assessment, or to make the owners of adjacent property pay for such paving, if they wish to cross
the railroad on a properly paved way?
RAILROAD PROPERTY OTHER THAN ROADBED

The first case to hold that the doctrine of the preceding cases is to be limited to assessments for improvements
adjoining the roadbed is the case of Mt. Pleasant Boro. v.
R. R. Co., 138 Pa., 365. It did not appear from the face
of the claim filed, except inferentially, that it was filed
against the roadbed. The lower court struck off the lien,
holding that neither the depot nor the roadbed was the subject of a municipal lien but the Supreme Court reinstated
it and awarded a procedendo that the facts might be shown.
The claim was for grading, paving and curbing a sidewalk
and Justice Paxson declared: "It is as important to have
a well paved walk to reach a railroadstation as it is to any
other place." The benefit to the company in such a case
being obvious, it was said that ground used for passenger
or freight stations was liable to assessment. It is held in
other cases that the duty to pave the sidewalk and the right
to collect the cost when the duty is disregarded after, notice,
rest on the police power and not on the power of taxation
but Justice Paxson did not refer to this difference, but
treated the case as an ordinary one of assessment for a
local improvement.
Compare Pittsburgh v. Biggert, 23
Super., 540.
In Mt. Joy Borough v. R. R. Co., 11 D. R., 765, a sidewalk was laid along ground owned by the railroad but the
tracks were about thirty feet from the street, the intervening ground being used to carry telegraph poles and for
a drainage ditch but the railroad declared it had purchased
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the ground for additional tracks. The court decided that
the exemption of a railroad from liability to assessment
for paving the roadway did not carry with its exemption
from liability for the paving of the footway, the obligation to pay for the latter being imposed as a police regulation and not under the taxing power. He added, however,
that as the use of the intervening ground for tracks was
in the uncertain future, the mere declaration of intention
to do so was not enough to confer immunity from assessment, even for the improvement of the roadway.
The first clear case of an assessment under the taxing power for an improvement adjoining railroad property other than a roadbed grew out of -the construction of a
sewer in front of the yards leading to the coal wharves
of the Phila. & Reading R. R. Co. in Philadelphia. Several
liens were filed and resulted in judgments for the plaintiff
in the court below. An appeal from our judgment was
taken to the Superior Court, and an appeal from another
was taken to the Supreme Court. The cases are Phila. v.
Phila. & Reading R. R. Co., 1 Super., 236, and 177 Pa., 292.
It was argued by the counsel for the company that the
yards were as necessary to the railroad's enjoyment of its
franchise as were the tracks on its main line, and that the
use of the ground made it as impossible for the railroad to
benefit from the building of the sewer as if it were along
the roadbed. Though the opinions of the Superior and
Supreme Courts run along different lines, they reach the
same conclusion. The assessments were both sustained.
Judge Rice thought it important that the land was
owned in fee and that a portion of it was not covered by
tracks. He cites many cases to show that as a general
rule, a property owner cannot defend a suit to enforce a
municipal claim on the ground that his property is not
benefited by the improvement, and that the only exception
is when the property is of a class as to which the courts
can declare as a conclusion of law that no special benefits
could accrue to it. The rural property cases and the roadbed cases are of this type. He did not think a railroad
yard to be within the exception.
As to the tracks

DICKINSON LAW

REVIEW

all being essential to the enjoyment of the franchise, he
thought that immaterial, for the Rading Terminal is
equally essential in the handling of the passenger traffic
but it would clearly be liable to a sewer assessment. He
examines in detail the reasons for exempting essential railroad property from general taxation and shows that they
are not applicable to taxation by local assessment. The
difficulty of enforcing the lien, the objection that was successfully urged in the road bed cases, he thought insufficient to invalidate the assessment. He thought the sale
could be so controlled by the court as to protect both the
city and the railroad. He was not disposed to regard the
yards as essential but rather as a convenience merely and
he was sure the unoccupied ground could be sold without
dismembering the railroad.
The foregoing decision rests on grounds that would
make it a controlling authority in any similar case arising
anywhere in the State.
The Supreme Court, however,
decided that the case turned upon a special act of assembly relating only to Philadelphia. The act in question provided that "the offices, depots, car houses, and other real
property of railroad corporations situated in Philadelphia,
the superstructure of the road and water stations only excepted, are and hereafter shall be subject to taxation by
ordinances, for city purposes."
The purpose of the act
was said to be the equalization of the public burden and
it was therefore thought that the word "taxation" should
be construed to include local assessments. As to the difficulty of enforcing the lien, the court said; "The plaintiff
has a lien on the land in excess of that not subject to municipal assessment; a sale of the land passes to the purchaser nothing the lien does not bind; he takes it subject to
defendant's easement. * * The road bed running to the river
through the yard, being necessary to the existence of the
road as a common carrier, cannot be taken from it by a
proceeding in rem against the yard; the purchaser takes
subject to the easement, etc." Thus the question as to
which of the many tracks were main tracks and which
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were not, was left for future determination in a contest between the company and the execution purchaser.
The case of Phila. v. Phila. & Frankford R. R. Co.,
177 Pa., 300, was decided on the authority of the last case,
but Justice Mitchell filed a dissenting opinion, stating that
he thought the jury should find whether the premises
liened were essential to the franchise or not, instead o
requiring the purchaser to buy subject to the risk of its
being later decided that the premises were essential and
hence not taxable by assessment or otherwise.
Another case of sewerage along a freight depot and
yards was before the Superior Court at the same time.
It was the case of Phila. v. N. P. R. R. Co., 1 Super. 254.
It was held to be ruled by the case of the Reading coal terminal just decided.
On June 4th, 1901, (P. L. 364), an act of assembly was
passed the fifth section of which provided that "all real
estate, by whomsoever owned, and for whatsoever purpose
used, shall be subject to all tax claims and municipal claims
herein provided for." There was no exemption of the
right of way of railroad companies. Accordingly the city
of Philadelphia proceeded to lay a water pipe on a street
and filed liens against the right of way of the P. & R. R. R.
Co., where it abutted on the street. The case is reported in
Phila.v. P. & R. R. R. Co. 38 Super. 529. It was held that the
assessment could not be sustained, not because a previous act
authorizing such an assessment had been held unconstitutional but for the reason expressed as follows: "Prior to
the enactment of this statute it has been held that the roadbed or other property of a railroad company essential to the
exercise of its franchise was not subject to taxation or municipal charges, while property which was held for mere
convenience in the conduct of its business was subject to taxation for both purposes. When the statute in question became a law it had been settled by judicial construction that
the words 'real estate' in a tax act did not include land essential to the exercise by a public corporation of its franchises, without which its public duties could not be performed. * * * The Act of 1901 was written in the light of
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these decisions, and the words 'real estate' when used therein must be held to have the meaning which had been given to
them by the Supreme Court in construing previous statutes
authorizing taxation of the same character, in the absence
of a clearly expressed legislative intention that they should
have a different meaning." The Supreme Court decisions
cited were cases discussing the liability of the right of way
to annual taxes for general purposes and it was taken for
granted that exemption from these meant exemption from
assessments also. It is possible that the defendant might
have found it convenient to secure water from the pipe and
it certainly could not have been said with the same assurance that a water pipe could not possibly be a benefit to it,
as was said in the other four roadbed cases of the paving
of the street. Unless this can be said, the reason for holding the earlier act unconstitutional does not apply and if
the legislature should "clearly express its intention," we
may find even the right of way of a railroad assessed for
water pipes.
The foregoing case was followed without discussion
in the case of Phila. to use v. Fairhill R. R. Co., 41 Super.,
246. Phila. v. R. R. Co., 15 D. R., 395, is a like case, similarly decided.
To summarize the railroad cases, we may say that no
lien can be filed against the roadbed for paving a street
that adjoins the roadbed or crosses it above or below the
grade of the railroad and the same is probably true, though
the crossing is at grade. The exemption extends to assessments for street grading, sewers or water pipes. If there
are any cases in which the roadbed may be assessed, they
have yet to be developed. We have in mind a street that
runs to a railroad station and on this account is much travelled. But for this fact it would not have been paved.
The roadbed abuts on one side of the street and is exempt
from assessment. The frontage of the statiofi proper on the
paved street is relatively very small. If the cost of the
paving be assessed on the foot front basis, the owners of
the property on the other side of the street will have to pay
the entire cost of the paving, though the paving was done
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almost entirely for the benefit of the railroad and its patrons. We hope the courts would create an exception to
their rule in such a case. We can say no more.
The doctrine of the roadbed cases extends to cases in
which there are several tracks, as well as to cases in which
there is but one, but doubt arises when sonie of the tracks are
used not merely as sidings for passing trains but for the
loading and unloading of cars. If the same track is used
for both purposes, its use for passing trains would probably
protect it from assessment. If used exclusively for loading
or storing cars, it is liable to assessment, as is all ground
not occupied at all or that is occupied by stations, warehouses, stockyards, or other appurtenances of a railroad.
Legislation that purports to impose liability to assessment upon the roadbed proper is unconstitutional and if
the intention so to do is not clearly expressed, the language will be so construed as to avoid the necessity of holding the act unconstitutional.
STREET RAILWAYS

We have no cases in which the question is presented
as to whether a street railway is liable to assessment, when
it owns its roadbed in fee or has a right of way running
along the side of a street that is improved by local assessment. Presumably the rule adopted in the railroad cases
would be applied. We do have a case in which it was attempted to assess a railway company, whose track ran
down the center of the street improved. The case is that
of HarriottAve., 24 Super., 597. The street was regraded
and $400 benefits were assessed by viewers against the
railway company. An answer to the broad question as to
the liability of such companies was avoided by holding that
the only property assessable under the Act of 1891 is property abutting on the improvement and Judge Porter thought
this involved only property that touched the improvement
on one side and not property that was superimposed upon
the improvement and surrounded by it. The question of
possible benefit was also discussed. "When it can be declared as a matter of law that no such benefit can arise, the
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burden cannot be lawfully imposed. The limit of the assessment is measured by the increase in the market value
of the property, caused by the benefit peculiar to it resulting from the improvement. It is manifest that the change
in the grade of a street cannot increase the market value
of the mere rails, ties and other material which enter into
the construction of a street railway." He intimated that
the improvement of the street would attract builders and so
add to those who would use the railway but this benefit is
too remote to be considered. Exceptions to the assessment
were sustained on the further grounds that the cost of a
second grading cannot be collected by assessment and assessments under the Act of '91 must be against the property
and not against the owner, and finally that only real estate
is liable to assessment.
The number and variety of the grounds for sustaining
the exceptions to the assessment detract from the value of
the decision in re the liability of the roadbed of a street
railway to assessment but it does decide that under existing
statutes the tracks of railway companies and the pipes, poles,
etc., of gas, water and light companies are not liable to assessment for change of grade or other street improvement.
A similar case is that of "In Re Cherry Lane," 50 Pitts.,
Leg. Journal,197. Viewers were appointed to assess benefits for the grading, paving and curbing of a street over
which ran a street railway. The railway had an agreement
with the municipality by which it bound itself to pay for the
paving of a portion of the street. In view of this contract
the viewers undertook to assess the railway. But the court
held that the act of '91 contained no authority to assess any
but abutting owners, and that other appropriate remedies
were available to the municipality to enforce its contract
with the railway company.
When, on'the other hand, it is provided in the charter
of a street railway company that it "shall be at the entire
cost and expense of paving, repaving and repairing that
may be necessary upon any street where the tracks of said
company may be laid," this operates to relieve the abutting
property owner from all liability to assessment for paving
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on such a street and hemay set up this legislation in a suit by
the city against himself to recover the cost of paving. Phila.
to use v. Market Co., 154 Pa., 93 and 161 Pa., 523. It was
objected that the charter was a contract between the State
and the company and that the property owners were not
parties to it. But -it was held that all. liability to assessment being of statutory origin, no such liability exists when
the duty to do the thing in question is imposed by legislation
on other persons. When the property owners have been so
relieved of their obligation by the legislature, it cannot be
reimposed by councils. A like case is that of Phila. to use
v. Bowman, 166 Pa., 393. When, however, the railway
assumes the liability for paving to secure the consent of
councils, it is competent for councils to relieve it from this
liability and the liability of the abutting property owners is
restored. It is imposed by the general law as soon as the
temporary exemption created by councils is at an end.
It has recently been decided, however, that when a railway company is released from charter obligation to pave
streets on which it lay tracks, in return for $500,000 paid by
it annually to the city, the liability of abutting property is
not restored. "The city must be regarded as having fixed,
as the amount which would represent the cost of paving the
streets, the large lumping sum which, under the contract,
it was to receive yearly, and the city cannot, with propriety,
be allowed to collect this sum both from the railway company and from the property owner." See Phila. v. Phila.
trustee, 244 Pa., 224, and 23 D. R., 108.
PUBLIC PROPERTY
The Act of March 19, 1903, P. L., 41, contains this provision: "Public property used for public purposes shall
not be subject to tax claims or municipal claims." The
first case involving property of this class ii McGonigle v.
City of Allegheny, 44 Pa., 118. It held that the whole cost
of paving a street must be borne by those who own lots facing city property as "it would be absurd for the corporation
to tax itself" for itself It so happened in this case that the
city property was a common and the injustice of a double as-
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sessment was concealed by declaring that it was "the price
he pays for the privilege of an open common in his front." *
"The location, which enhances the value of his property,
subjects him to a corresponding increase in taxation, and
this is right." But when the exempt property is a jail, a
market house, a court house, a post office, a cemetery, or a
railroad roadbed, is the property opposite enhanced in value
by the location of exempt property opposite?
Until 1900 the only other decisions were those of lower
courts. In Boro. of Emaus v. Emaus School District, 12
C. C. Reps., 349, it was held that a school district could not
be made to pay for the water used in erecting a school building when the water works are municipal property. In
Warren Boro. v. Pleasant Bridge Co., 16 C. C., Rep., 44, it
was held that a lien for street paving could not be filed
against land owned by the borough. In Phila. v. Girard Estate, 9 D. R., 273, it was held that the property of said estate was liable to assessment, though the city was the trustee. "In considering a claim of immunity we look to the
property and not to the trustee to see if the property is entitled to exemption. * * * It is the property and not the trustee, which is charged for the improvement. There is no
personal liability."
In 1900 two cases of assessment against school property
arose. Judge Brown of Pittsburgh held a school district
liable to assessment for a fair portion of the cost of a sewer
constructed in the street upon which the school property
abutted. He relied upon the line of cases that hold that
exemption from periodical taxation does not involve exemption from assessment. He thought it necessary to remark
that "Substantialjustice is the guiding rule of the courts."
If the assessment couldn't be enforced by a sale of the school
property, he thought a mandamus execution or some other
statutory or equitable process would secure payment. See
In Re Construction of Sewer on Harding Street, 31 Pitts.,
Leg. J., (N. S.), 147. The other case arose in Erie and involved a municipal lien for paving the street in front of
school property. This court thought that a sale of the property on a levari facios was the only available method of
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compelling payment and such seizure and sale he thought
would be unlawful. "A municipal lien, being a proceeding
in rem, cannot be sustained against the property of a public
school district. * * It is not necessary here to decide whether
or not the city has any remedy aganist the defendant for the
improvement in controversy."
He too seems to have
thought it a bit unjust to place the entire cost of the sewer
on the private owners of land across the street from the
school property. See Erie City v. Erie City School District,
23 C. C. Reps., 428. An appeal from this decision was taken
to the Superior Court and the decision was affirmed. See
17 Super. Ct., 33. As in the early railroad cases, the court
places its decision on the presumed legislative intent. "We
have not referred to the right of the legislature to adopt
laws by which a charge, in the nature of a tax, may be imposed upon public property. We hold only that the act now
before us (Act of May 23, 1889, P. L., 288), is not sufficiently explicit to permit the recovery of a judgment by the plaintiff in this case." The act authorized assessing "any property abutting on the improvement." It seems that school
property must be specifically named to render the legislative intent to assess it clear. The court thought a mandamus execution would have been available to compel payment but added: "It is but the transfer of public funds
from one public treasury to another. We will not presume
in the absence of explicit enactment, that the legislature
intended to authorize so useless and unreasonable a proceeding." Perhaps had he owned a lot across the street,
he would not have thought the proceeding so useless or unreasonable.
The appeal from the Pittsburgh case was to the Supreme Court and that court also held that school property
is exempt from assessment. See Pittsburghv. Sub-district
School, 204 Pa., 635. The assessment was made under the
Act of 1891, P. L., 75, under which viewers assess each property in proportion to the benefit it derives from the improvement and if the assessments do not equal the cost of the
improvement, the deficit must be met out of the general
revenues of the municipality. When the assessments are
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apportioned by this method the exemption of a property
does not add to the burden of the opposite properties as
when the foot front rule is used, but it adds to the burden to
be borne by the city as a whole. The school of the sub-district was exclusively for the use of residents of that subdistrict, and it was argued that to transfer the burden from
the sub-district to the city as a whole was to compel taxpayers in a remote corner of the city to share the burden
of paying for a purely local benefit. But the Supreme
Court thought that as each sub-district in the city would
in time benefit at the expense of the whole, the gain and
loss would balance in the long run.
Like the Act of '89, construed by the Superior Court,
the Act of '91 though providing for the assessment of "any
property or properties," etc., was construed as referring
only to private property. "If public property purchased by
funds raised by taxation is subjected to taxation for a local
public improvement, it is the public paying the public,which
clearly discloses the absurdity of the proposition."
We
wonder whether the result might have been different, had
the question been first presented to the court in a case involving the foot front rule, with the alterative of transferring the burden from the school district to the shoulders of
the other abutting property owners, an injustice that would
never be righted, however long the run.
This decision was followed without comment in Scranton v. Scranton School District, 4 Lack. Jus., 367.
All doubt as to the legislative intent to exempt school
propert3y was removed by the Act of May 18, 1911, P. L.,
352, Sec. 631. It provides as follows: "All school property
owned by any school district, real or personal, that is occupied and used by any school district for public school,
recreation, or any other purposes provided for by this act,
shall be and hereby is made exempt from every kind of State,
county, city, borough, township or other tax, as Well as for
all costs or expense for paving, curbing, sidewalks, sewers
or other municipal improvements. Provided, That any
school district may make any municipal improvement, in
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any street upon which its school property abuts, or may
contribute any sum toward the cost thereof."
That the legislature was not unmindful that this exemption of school property would work hardship is shown
by the fact that on June 8th, (P. L., 714), of the same year,
it passed an act authorizing boroughs to pave streets and
collect from abutting owners on the front foot plan. It
provided that if both sides of the street were assessable,
each side should bear one-third of the cost, the borough
paying a third. But where one side is exempt, those on
the other side were to pay one' half and the borough half.
Thus inequality, though diminished, 'was preserved. Five
days after the passage of this act, another was passed,
(See Act of June 13, 1911, P. L., 887). It repeals inconsistent acts. It covers the same ground as the Act of June
8th, but it eliminates the provision in the latter act that distinguishes between those opposite exempt property and
those opposite assessable property, so that those opposite
exempt property must now pay two thirds of the cost of
paving in boroughs, whereas those opposite non-exempt
property pay but one third. We wonder if many who
voted for the later act were not intending to eliminate the
inequality-of burden in the earlier act while they unconsciously increased it.
In Harrisburg v. Fuller, 41 C. C., Rep., 449, we find a
city going to the extreme of exempting from assessment all
private property facing public property. The latter happened to be a park, and instead of paying a double assessment those facing the park escaped all assessment. The
ordinance was held valid but its effect upon the size of the
assessments upon other properties, under the front foot rule,
was not discussed.

To be continued
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MOOT COURT
CRAWFORD v. HALBERT
Trespass
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Crawford was employed about dangerous machinery by Halbert.
Certain safeguards were absent and he objected to continuing in
the employment, unless they were furnished. Halbert agreed that
they should be furnished within two weeks. Crawford then agreed
to continue to work, but on the next day, met with an accident which
would not have occurred, had the safeguards been in place. Suing
for damages he is met with the contention that he was negligent in
continuing to work with knowledge of dangerousness of the place.
Wilson, for plaintiff.
Kearney for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
POTTER, J. In order that a servant may be relieved from the
operation of assumption of risk from a defect complained of and damage of which he was no longer willing to incur, it is essential that his
remaining in employment be induced by a promise of the master
to remedy the defect, when he would not otherwise have done so.
Mureon v. N. Y., etc. Co., 167 Pa., 220. Applying this to case at bar
the assumption of risk is relieved by the promise of the defendant to
furnish the safeguards.
Where the servant notifies the master of defects and the master
promises to remedy them the servant is not guilty of contributory negligence by continuing work for a reasonable
time unless the danger is so obvious and imminent that no
ordinarily prudent man would do so. Wust v. Erie City Iron Works,
149 Pa., 263. Mestrezat, J., in Webster v. Coal and Coke Co., 201 Pa.,
278, says: "Where a servant remains in the service of his master after
he has knowledge of the dangerous condition of the place in which he is
engaged, he is presumed to assume the risk of danger; but this presumption is rebutted if the master promises to repair the defect and
the danger is not so obvious and imminent that negligence can fairly
be imputed to the servant for exposing himself to it." These two cases
raise the question whether plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. Now then in the first place, the burden is on the defendant
to prove contributory negligence in such cases (Cooley on Torts,
page 703), and in the second place the presumption is, that in the absence of evidence to show otherwise a man is presumed to have used
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the ordinary care of a prudent man. If he acted as a prudent man would
have done, it follows from the above cases that the danger was not
so obvious and imminent as to make the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence.
It may be argued that you may assume the danger to be obvious
and imminent else the plaintiff would not have refused to work and
it is a question for the jury. But this is answered by the burden on
the defendant of proving contributory negligence.
Judgment for plaintiff because defendant failed to prove contributory negligence and there is. no evidence to rebut the presumption
that the plaintiff acted as an ordinarily prudent man would have
acted.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
That a workman, dependent on his daily toil for a subsistence,
shall be held to have assumed the risks which are known to him, for
which asumption he obtains an appreciable compensation, and the
motive for which is simply the necessity of working or starving, is
one of the barbarous principles which a capitalistic judiciary foisted
upon the law.
Some mitigation of the cruelty of the principle was wrought
when it was conceded that, if the risk was occasioned by the failure
of the master to furnish a safe place, or to render the operation of
machinery as little hazardous as possible by the adoption of contrivances the workman should not be regarded as assuming the risk,
if he had received a promise from the employer to adopt proper safeguards, or make proper repairs, and continued in the employ in consequence of this promise, and if continuance in the employ did not
"threaten immediate danger;" Meade v. Pittsburgh Railway Co.,
223 Pa., 145; a danger "so obviously imminent that any reasonable
person must have appreciated it," Id, Hollis v. Widener, 221 Pa., 72;
Foster v. National Steel Co., 216 Pa., 279.
In this case, the plaintiff agreed to continue to work for two
weeks, within which time the defendant promised to make the needful changes. To work for two weeks with machinery in a dangerous
condition, is ordinarily indefensible. The nature of the dangerousness
is however not disclosed, and the court could do no better than refer
the question of negligence or recklessness to the jury.
The jury has found that the plaintiff did not act negligently or
recklessly.
Affirmed.
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COMMONWEALTH v. MARTELLO
OPINION OF THE COURT
Stuart, for plaintiff.
Yates, for defendant.
SHELLEY, J. The outcome of the case at bar depends upon the
place where title to the barrel of whiskey passed from vendor to vendee. From the facts which have been offered by the prosecution and
with which the counsel for the defense agrees, we find that the whiskey was to be delivered in Carlisle, Cumberland Co. We further find
that the contract did not specify how that delivery was to be made but
that the vendor delivered the whiskey from his place of business in
York Co. to Carlisle, Cumberland Co. in his own wagon. This necessarily brings the turning point of the case to the question, whether
title passed to the vendee upon the receipt of the letter of acceptance
from the vendor, or whether the delivery of the whiskey to Carlisle
was an incident to the contract, thus postponing the passing of title
until the receipt of the whiskey by Donnely.
A sale being an intangible thing, we must consider the intention
of the parties as to where the sale was to be completed. If a part of
the contract was to deliver to Carlisle, the sale, under no circumstances, could have been intended by the parties to pass title until
Donnely had received the whiskey at his place of business. But was
this their intention? Could we not argue just as logically that the
delivery to Carlisle was merely a matter of courtesy on the part of
Martello in order to induce Donnely to trade with him and to save
him, Donnely, the trouble of seeing that the goods in question arrived at his place of business?
Also we find that the contract was for a specific barrel of whiskey and that draws a line of distinction between this case and that
cited by the prosecution in 96 Pa., 449. Garbracht v. Commonwealth. Further we find that "if the subject matter of the contract
is a specific chattel and the terms are fully agreed upon the effect
of such contract is to vest the property or title to the chattel in the
bargainee..
From 228 Pa., 188.-26 Sup. Ct., 82.
There can certainly be no doubt that the subject matter of this
contract was a specific barrel of whiskey and also that the terms of
the sale were fully agreed upon. The facts stating the specific barrel
and the price to be sixty (60) dollars. What more could there be to
make the contract executory? If this can be considered good law,
which we have no reason to believe is otherwise, it follows that the
title to the whiskey vested in the bargainee at the time of the receipt
of the acceptance from the bargainor.
This idea of the transfer of title to the specific chattel can further
be brought to correspond with the case cited by the prosecution of
Comm. v. Hess, 148 Pa., 98, which, so far as we have been able to
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learn, is considered as the leading case on this question in this State.
In that case (supra) we find the law to be that the passing of title
on the sale of goods depends on the intention derived from the contract or circumstances. The circumstances from which this intention
can be derived are such as actual delivery, weighing and setting
aside, etc.
It is by no means a rash conclusion to draw from the facts as
presented that this barrel of whiskey was set aside biy the defendant
as soon as he accepted the offer of Donnely. Do the facts not say a
specific barrel? What merchant would accept an offer for the sale
of a specific chattel and not label it or put it aside until he could arrange to either deliver it himself or have it delivered to the bargainee?
Any other view than this would certainly be inconsistent with the advanced methods of business of the present day merchant.
In Benjamin on Sales (357) we see that the contract to sell and not
the payment or delivery is the important element to pass title to the
property. If this is the law there is no doubt whatever that the title
passed to the bargainee as soon as he received the acceptance from
Martello.
Justice Paxton in Commonwealth v. Hess (supra) says the followingis the climax of absurdity, "if in pursuance of an order from
an adjoining county the bargainee delivers the whiskey to a common
carrier for transportation, he is a law abiding citizen, but if he delivers it in his own wagon to the bargainee as part of the contract, he is
a criminal." Suppose for instance there was no common-carrier
available. Could we logically say that the law will allow a man to
contract for the sale of a barrel of whiskey and another to accept
the offer and yet not be able to get possession of the whiskey, because, if the vendor delivers it, he will subject himself to a criminal
prosecution? We think this is not the intention of the law and altho
some of the courts have adopted that view of the matter, we do not
feel inclined to follow in their footsteps.
Arriving, as we do, at the conclusion that the intention of the
parties was to pass the title to the whiskey as soon as the letter of
acceptance reached Donnely, and consequently the sale took place before the delivery of the whiskey into Cumberland Co., it necessarily
follows from this conclusion that the indictment must be quashed.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
The barrel of whiskey was specified in the offer. The offer was
accepted, and the acceptance was transmitted by mail. The price
of the barrel was at once charged to Donnely on the vendor's books.
This was a completed sale. Martello was to deliver the whiskey in
Carlisle, either by some common-carrier or otherwise but the delivery
was not of whiskey, the property of Martello, until delivery, but of
whiskey, that was already the property of Donnely.
We think therefore that, as it is not a crime for A to deliver X's
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beer to X, without a license to deliver it, no crime occurred in Cumberland county.
The learned court below properly held that there could be no
conviction.
The learned court below does not seem to have had the aid of the
very able discussion of "How to Locate a Sale," by Prof. McKeehan,
in 16th Dickinson Law Review, p. 89.
TAFT v. NICHOLS
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Taft in this case employed Nichols, who is a civil engineer, to
ascertain the boundaries of his lot. Nichols indicated the lines knowing that Taft intended to erect a large residence upon the lot facing
the street. The house when erected was two feet back from the line
as marked by Nichols. The city authorities finding that the house
invaded the street to the extent of two feet required him to remove
so much of it as constituted the purpresture. Taft is now suing for
the cost of removal and damages.
Basehore, for the plaintiff.
Ingram, for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
HEMPHILL, J. As far as we have been able to learn in our search
through the books, there is no Pennsylvania case in point. There are
several cases in which property owners have attempted to recover
from the city for damages caused by the erroneous survey of a city
engineer, and in these cases it was held that the only action the property owner had was against the surveyor personally. We consequently infer that a right of action does exist. Alcorn v. city of
Phila., 44 Pa., 348; Shull's Appeal, 11 W. N. C., 350.
In a careful review of the facts, we cannot find the slightest intimation that the defendant was guilty of open negligence, such as
reading the chain wrong or overlooking a lot. To be sure the defendant, having held himself out as a professional man, was bound to
exercise reasonable care and skill, or he would be liable for negligence
or fraud or want of skill. It would be unreasonable to hold him as
insuring the correctness of his work. But it is necessary that a professional surveyor should discharge his duties carefully, diligently,
honestly and skillfully, and when he does this he has done all that is
required by law.
The skill that is required is a reasonable amount
of skill and absolute correctness of his work is not the test. 38
L. R. A., (N. S.) 1043-notes. Applying these principles to the present case, has the defendant employed in his work the necessary
knowledge and skill to perform the same properly and correctly?
It is an obvious fact that the plaintiff was given a wrong survey and we could easily infer from this that the work was not done prop-
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erly, but are we not, by so doing, making absolute correctness the test
of the amount of skill the law requires? And such a test is more
than the law requires and is unjust; all men are human. We therefore
feel bound to hold that the plaintiff cannot recover without proof of
want of skill on the part of the defendant. He must show how his
work has been defective by extrinsic proof. If lack of skill had been
shown, we would have allowed the plaintiff to recover a reasonable
sum for the removal of the house and for rebuilding the wall, but
could not have found for him general damages.
In Taft v. Rutherford, 66 Wash., 256, which is a case almost on
all fours with the one at bar, it was held that one employed to locate
the boundaries of a lot upon which, to his knowledge, its owner desires to place a certain character of building, will be liable for the cost
of removing the building, in case through his error in making the survey, it is not located on the owner's property." We would undoubtedly follow the reasoning in this case and reach the same conclusion,
were it not for the fact that the evidence in this case clearly showed
want of skill. The defendant admitted he had made a wrong survey,
and it was shown by the evidence that he had overlooked the parking
strip or misread the figures on the chain. This was clearly not due
care and can be easily differentiated by this from the case at bar..
In Commissioners v. Beebe, 55 Mich., 137, which case was sent up
on a demurrer, it was held, "whether he was professional or official
surveyor or represented himself as such, his undertaking was that he
should bring to the work the necessary knowledge and skill to perform
the same properly and correctly, and if he failed so to do, and the employer sustained damage in consequence of such failure, the plaintiff
will be entitled to recover."Likewise, as in the case above, the defendant here is specifically charged with negligence and want of skill.
We must therefore render a judgment in favor of the defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
The learned court below decides that the defendant was not liable
unless he was negligent that the burden of proving negligence was
upon the plaintiff, and that as there was no proof tending to show
negligence there can be no recovery in this case. In this conclusion
we concur.
That the gist of the plaintiff's cause of action was the negligence
of the defendant in his employment as engineer is well established by
the following authorities: Terrie v. Sperry, 85 Conn., 337, 82 Atl.,
577; McCarty v. Bauer, 3 Kan., 237; Highway com. v. Beebe, 55
Mich., 137.
That the burden of proving negligence was upon the plaintiff is
a fair inference from the remarks of the court in Highway Com. v.
Beebe, 55 Mich., 137 and Taft v. Rutherford, 66 Wash., 256, and the
drawing of this inference is rendered more justifiable by the fact that
in actions to recover damages for injuries caused by the negligence
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of members of other professions, e. g., physicians and lawyers, it has
been uniformly held that the burden of proving negligence is upon
the plaintiff. 4 Cyc.,. 973, 3 A. & E., 384, 30 Cyc., 1584. Wohlert v.
Seibert, 23 Super. Ct., 213.
Judgment affirmed.

ROBERTS v. LOOMIS
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A devised a farm to his son Adam for life, with the power to appoint the remainder in fee to whomsoever he would. Five years
after A's death, Adam made a mortgage in fee of the land for $5,000
to Roberts. Adam subsequently died devising the farm in execution of the power to Loomis.
This is a scire facias upon the mortgage, naming Loomis as
terre-tenant.
Gunter, for plaintiff.
Fanseen, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
EVANS, J. We will consider the question "Did Adam exercise
his power of appointment by mortgaging the land in fee for $5,000,
or was it a mortgage on his life estate only?"
To decide this, we must first see what power was given him
under the will. If he had a power of sale, this mortgage would in
Pennsylvania, have been an execution of the power, at least to the
extent of the mortgage.
An absolute and unrestricted power to sell includes the power
to mortgage. Zane v. Kennedy, 73 Pa., 182; Asay v. Hoover, 5 Pa.,
21; Lancaster v. Dolan, 1 Rawle, 231.
The attorney for the plaintiff cites 16 Cyc., 641, Scott v. Bryan, and
McCreary v. Bomberger. These all stand for the proposition that the
power to sell includes the power to mortgage. We admitted and would
hold this mortgage a valid execution of his power, did we think the
testator meant to give him this power of sale.
The power that the "donee" has is a question of intent as expressed in the instrument creating it. 31 Cyc., 1044. Usually a power is
given by words which show its extent, such as sell, lease, mortgage,
as the case may be. Also a power of sale is often inferred where
the provision could not be carried out without it. Tiffany on Real
Property, p. 615. But here no power of sale was given nor is it
necessary to sell to carry out the provisions of the will. Indeed the
intention seems clearly to have been not to give this power or the
testator would have given Adam a fee simple or directly stated the
power of sale.
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But he did not do this and we assume he intended Adam to have
only a life estate and to derive no benefit out of the remainder. Therefore to allow Adam to mortgage the whole thing and hold the money
to his own use is to allow him to do indirectly what he could not do
directly.
Therefore arriving at the conclusion that the mortgage was an
improper execution of his power, we hold that the remainder was not
affected by it, and the scire facias is discharged.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
The farm was devised to Adam for life. He received the power
to appoint the remainder, in whatever mode, and to whomsoever he
would. He could appoint by a mortgage as well as by any other form
of conveyance. He could partially or totally exercise the power.
The mortgage must be deemed as made in exercise of the power.
It purported to convey a fee. Adam's extate was only for life. The
mortgage must be deemed valid.
But the mortgage did not exhaust the remainder. There was still
an equity of redemption. There may be successive exercises of a
power, and what is not disposed of in the first may be disposed of in
a later exercise. The mortgage left still an estate. This residue was
susceptible of appointment. As the power was general, it could be
exercised whether by deed or by will. The partial exercise might be
by deed and the exercise upon the residue, might be by will.
The result is that Robert's mortgage can be enforced against the
land. Had the equity of redemption not been disposed of, it would
have been enforceable against the heir for the testator A would have
died interstate as to the interest in excess of the mortgage. The devise by Adam simply substitutes Loomis for the heir. Loomis takes
only what Adam had the power to give after giving the mortgage.
We must therefore differ from the learned court below.
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.
COMMONWEALTH v. SVEDRUP
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Svedrup indicted for murder, is unable to understand English,
Italian or Hungarian. Certain English witnesses testify against
him where the testimony is not translated into Swedish, because no
one is present who understands Swedish. The prisoner is unable
to make his wish that the testimony be translated known to the court.
An Italian and Hungarian testify against him, their testimony being
translated into English. He is convicted. He alleges that he has
been deprived of his constitutional right.
Smith, for plaintiff.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
Parsons, for defendant.
LEVIN, J. The question to be decided is whether the defendant
has been deprived of his constitutional right.
We have found very little authority upon which to base our opinion. Such cases are infrequent, where courts refuse or neglect to
furnish some one to translate the testimony of an accused or against
the latter. In order to conform with State or the Federal Constitution
the courts as a rule provide interpreters so as to inform the accused
of the nature and cause of the accusation.
The fourteenth amendment of the constitution reads as follows:
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the U. S.; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process
of law."
"In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to
be informed of the nature and cause of accusation and to be confronted with the witness against him." 6th amendment.
"In all criminal prosecutions the accused hath the right to beheard by himself and his counsel, to demand the cause of accusation
against him." Art. 1, sec. 9, .Pa. Constitution.
"Due process of law" implies at least a conformity with natural
and inherent principles of justice and forbids that one man's property,
or right to property shall be taken for the benefit of another and that
no one shall be condemned in his person or property without opportunity of being heard in his own defense. Holden v. Hardy, 18 S C.,
383; 169 U. S., 366.
On examining the facts in the case at bar and applying above
principle to said case, it is obvious that the defendant was deprived
of his "due process of law." The court in above case, defining "due
process of law," says: "No one shall be condemned in his person or
property without opportunity of being heard in his own defense."
This certainly was done in the case at bar. The defendant Svedrup
is indicted for murder. He was unable to understand the testimony
given against him and either through indifference or negligence the
court failed to provide an interpreter so that he might testify himself
or make his wish known that the testimony against him be translated.
He was convicted of murder without opportunity of being heard in
his own defense. Such methods to deprive a man of his life has no
precedents. The court could have provided an interpreter, had it
wished to inconvenience itself, at any rate the defendant should not
have been tried until one was found.
In Ralph v. State, 52 S. E., 297, the court said: "Where a defendant is deaf and can not hear the evidence of the witnesses of the
State, the presiding judge should permit some reasonable mode of
having their evidence communicated to him. If the prisoner is unable through defects of his faculties to understand the nature of the
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proceedings against him, he can not be convicted.
In U. S. v. Noelke, 17 Blatch, 554, the court held that every person has a right to be informed of the nature of the accusation, that
is held to mean that the offense must be set out with clearness and
all necessary certainty to apprise the accused of the crime with which
he stands charged.
In State v. Maumson, 45 L. R. A., 638, the prosecutrix on taking
the stand, she being an infant, stated to the court that she was afraid
to testify against the defendant. The court therefore ordered the defendant away, out of the sight and hearing of the witness.
The appellate court held "that the lower court erred in ordering
the defendant out of sight or hearing of the prosecutrix."
"The accused should not only be within the walls of the court
house but he should be present where the trial is conducted, that he
may see and be seen, hear and be heard under such regulations as the
law has established." Brown v. State, 38 Texas, 483:
"In all criminal prosecutions every man has a right to be informed of the accusation against him." 64 N. C., 74.
In the case relied upon by the commonwealth, Felts v. Murphy,
201 U. S., 123, the accused being deaf could only hear through an ear
trumpet. He testified in his own behalf but did not hear the testimony against him. Had he asked for any information the court
would have no doubt furnished him with same but he neglected to
request the court to inform him of the proceedings and only after
the trial when he was informed of the verdict did he complain. The
appellate court said: "There might have been an error committed
by the trial court, omitting to have the evidence repeated to the appellant as it was given by the witness at the trial, even though no demand of the kind was made by the petitioner or his counsel. The
case at bar is altogether different from above case. In the latter,
Felts was merely deaf and could have made his wishes known to the
court and could have received the necessary information had he
wished same through his ear trumpet while in the former case, had
he wanted to testify or desired to know what was testified against him,
there was no one in court who understood his language.
We therefore hold that the defendant was deprived of his con.
stitutional right and we therefore grant a new trial.
New trial granted.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The constitution of Pennsylvania assures to the accused in all
criminal prosecutions, the right to "meet the witnesses face to face."
This embraces the right to be aware of what the witnesses are saying
while testifying, and to cross-examine them. If the prisoner is deaf,
the testimony may be written. If he is deaf and blind, or unable to
read, a serious difficulty would be presented. A person thus afflicted
is hardly superior to the law against homicide. The constitutional
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provision is not made to be applicable to cases application of it to
which would result in the exemption of guilty persons from penalty.
If it could appear that translation of the testimony into Swedish
could not have been with any effort, procured, we should not say that
the accused could not be properly tried. The impossibility of commanding the service of interpreters is not clear and the learned trial
court has therefore properly awarded a new trial. The violation of
what is ordinarily a constitutional right, should. not occur, unless the
unavoidableness of it appears with the utmost clearness. Cf. Zunago v. State, 63 Texas Crim., 58; 138 S. W., 713.

BYRNE v. HUGHES
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Hughes told a newspaper reporter that Byrne, a minister of the
gospel had cheated him, describing the transaction. Hughes knew
that he was talking to a reporter and believed that he would cause
his paper to print the charge. Hughes did not request the printing of
it nor allude to the newspaper. In this action of trespass for a libel,
Hughes' attorney asked the court to say that there could be no recovery unless the publication Was found by the jury to be false and
malicious. The court refused. Verdict for plaintiff, damages $1500.
Rockmaker, for plaintiff.
Wise, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
PIFER, J. The question presented in this case is whether the
court below rightly refused to charge the jury as requested by the
counsel for the defendant. The 3rd section of the act of April 11th,
1901, enacts that "In all civil actions for libel no damages shall be recovered unless it is established to the satisfaction of the jury under
the direction of the court as in other cases that the publication has
been maliciously or negligently made, but where malice or negligence
appears such damages may be awarded as the jury shall deem
proper." In Clark v. North American, 203 Pa., 346; Mitchell J., it was
held that "where a libelous article refers to a person named or if so
written that it will reasonably be taken to refer to him, it establishes
legal malice within the meaning of sec. 3 of the Act of April 11th,
1901. The act has not made any changes in the law in this respect.
If an article is libelous per se and is false as to the plaintiff,
malice is shown and the burden of defense is upon the defendant."
It is evident that the act does not apply to this case as the facts
show that the publication is libelous per se. "Publications charging
fraudulent conduct or the uttering of a lie or words imputing dishonesty are libelous per se." 55 L. R. A., 214; 63 Pa., 253; 177 Pa., 620.
Nor is it privileged "a communication to be privileged must be made
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upon a proper occasion from a proper motive and fnust be based upon
reasonable or probable cause." 111 Pa., 404; 33 Pa., 411.
Hughes knew that he was talking to a reporter and believed that
he would cause his paper to print the charge. There can be no doubt
as to his malicious intent. "Malice in its legal sense means a wrongful act done intentionally without just cause or excuse and every utterance or publication having the other qualities of slander and libel,
if it be wilful and unauthorized is in law malicious and sufficient to
support an action." 87 Pa., 385; 111 Pa., 145.
The facts in Tourmaline v. Holmes, Dickinson Law Review, vol.
14, page 165, differ from the facts in the present case in that the
defendant really thought he was using the name of an imaginary
man, and had no malicious intent. No one's profession, business or
means of livelihood was effected from the story of the dreaming
editor. In the present case the insult was published with malicious
intent and with the particular minister in mind. Would it be justice
not to hold the defendant guilty of such a libel? Does the law expose ministers of the gospel, whose position and success all depend on
the reputation they have among their fellowmen, to men whose
charge when believed will naturally raise the strongest indignation
in all who hear them, especially when published in the public press,
which is one of the great powers of the day? "Any words spoken of
a person's profession, business or means of getting a livelihood which
tend to expose him to the hazard of losing his office are actionable."
A. & E. Encyc., vol. 18, page 942.
The judgment of this court is that the judgment should be
affirmed.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
Hughes must be held to have published the defamation. He did
not request the printing. That was not necessary. He knew he was
talking to a reporter, and believed that the reporter would cause the
newspaper to print the defamatory article. The causal relation of
Hughes to the publication is clear. Wills v. Hardcastle, 19 Super., 525.
The court declined to tell the jury that there could be no recovery
unless the publication was found by the jury to be false and malicious.
When a publication is defamatory, its untruth is assumed until
its truth is established. The defendant has the burden of proving
its truth. There can be a recovery unless the jury finds that its truth
has been established. But, to establish the truth is one thing; to prove
its falsity is another thing. No burden is on the plaintiff to prove
its falsity. If the evidence leaves the jury in doubt whether the
imputation is true or false the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict. To
be in doubt is not to find the defamation false. Hence the court
properly refused to tell the jury that their verdict must be for the
defendant unless they found that the defamatory words were false.

